What Is CEO Talent Worth?
IntroductIon
The topic of executive compensation elicits strong emotions among corporate stakeholders, practitioners, and observers. On the one hand are those who believe firmly that chief executive officers in the United States are overpaid. They cite as evidence the large and growing disparity between total pay granted to CEOs and the compensation of the average worker.
1 Their solution is the encouragement of more shareholder activism (primarily through proxy measures, such as say on pay) to communicate concerns to companies and induce a voluntary reduction in compensation levels or stricter performance-based features that more closely align compensation to financial and operating results. Some go so far as to suggest that CEO compensation be regulated at a fixed multiple of the average worker's pay.
On the other side of the issue are those who believe that chief executives are paid the going fairmarket rate. They argue that if compensation levels are high among the largest U.S. corporations, it is simply a reflection of the demands of a position that require considerable time, skill, and attention. They advocate continued disclosure on compensation size and structure so that market forces correct the mispricing of talent in situations where it arises.
Researchers have taken various approaches to evaluating whether CEO pay levels are appropriate. Gabaix and Landier (2008) measure the relation between CEO compensation and company size. They find that although CEO pay increased sixfold between 1980 and 2003, the market value of the companies these CEOs managed also increased sixfold during this period. They conclude that "the rise in CEO compensation is a simple mirror of the By david f. larcker, Usman liaqat and Brian tayan January 24, 2012 rise in the value of large U.S. companies since the 1980s."
2 Similarly, Kaplan and Rauh (2010) compare the growth rate of executive compensation to the growth rate of other highly paid professionals, such as hedge fund managers, private equity managers, venture capitalists, lawyers and professional athletes. They find that pay among these groups all grew by roughly the same order of magnitude during the period 1994 to 2005. They conclude that CEO compensation has increased due to market forces that contribute to general wage inflation among highly paid professionals, and that extreme compensation growth has not been limited to the business world. However, it is important to remember that demonstrating a correlation between executive compensation and firm size or performance does not mean that pay levels themselves are appropriate. It might still be the case that CEO pay itself is either too high or too low on average. 4 The only way to make a determination is to measure whether the total compensation received is commensurate with the value of services rendered. To do this, stakeholders need to understand 1) the value drivers of the organization, 2) the impact that the executive has on these value drivers, and 3) the percentage of value created that should be appropriately offered as compensation for performance. While this is simple in theory, it is exceptionally difficult in practice.
Performance and comPensatIon
The value drivers (or key performance indicators) of an organization include the financial and nonfinancial metrics that reflect the current and future performance of the company (see Exhibit 1). They might be generic in nature and applicable to most companies (such as revenue growth, profit margin, and return on invested capital) or specific measures that are relevant to a particular industry or line of business (such as research and development pipeline productivity or on-time delivery rates). Similarly, they might be readily quantifiable (such as product defect rates) or more qualitative in nature and therefore require proprietary methods of measurement (such as customer and employee satisfaction). It is the responsibility of management and the board of directors to identify the value drivers that are most critical to the success of the corporate strategy. This process is best accomplished through rigorous statistical testing that demonstrates a proven correlation between the relevant metric and changes in corporate value. 5 The valid performance indicators of the company then serve as the basis for measuring management performance and awarding compensation.
The challenge for the board is to determine what level of compensation to offer to chief executive officers for the achievement of specific performance objectives. This can be an extremely difficult task, not least of which because it is not always easy to determine how much corporate value creation should be attributable to the efforts of a single individual.
6
Although a considerable number of theorists and practitioners have argued that CEOs play a critical role affecting firm performance, the empirical research on this issue is mixed. Thomas (1988) finds that CEOs are responsible for only 3.9 percent of the variance in performance among companies, while Mackey (2005) finds that the impact is much greater: as high as 29.2 percent. 7 The view that board members have on this issue will have a substantial impact on what they view as reasonable CEO compensation (see Exhibit 2).
Finally, the board must determine the percentage of value creation to award in compensation. Although there are no agreed upon standards, observation of compensation practices among other talent pools might serve as a guide. For example, the CEOs that manage private-equity owned companies receive on average 5.4 percent of the equity upside (in the form of stock and options).
8 A-list actors in Hollywood receive $10 to $30 million per film, plus 10 to 20 percent of gross profits.
9 Music artists receive 8 to 25 percent of the suggested retail price of an album, a $0.08 performance royalty when a song is played live or broadcast, plus a percentage of the gross profit generated on tour (see Exhibit 3). 10 Similarly, in setting compensation for CEO talent, the board should target a payout in relation to performance or value creation. In this regard, the structure of the compensation contract will be as important as its overall size. 
METrICs UsEd In shOrT-TErM InCEnTIvE PLans
sample includes the most prevalent metrics in short-and long-term incentive plans for ceos at s&P 1500 companies. note that nonfinancial performance metrics are not a common feature of long-term plans. 
METrICs UsEd In LOnG-TErM InCEnTIvE PLans

